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Abstract
Iris recognition is used in many applications around the world, with enrollment sizes as
large as over one billion persons in India’s Aadhaar program. Large enrollment sizes can
require special optimizations in order to achieve fast database searches. One such optimiza-
tion that has been used in some operational scenarios is 1:First search. In this approach,
instead of scanning the entire database, the search is terminated when the first sufficiently
good match is found. This saves time, but ignores potentially better matches that may
exist in the unexamined portion of the enrollments. At least one prominent and successful
border-crossing program used this approach for nearly a decade, in order to allow users a fast
“token-free” search. Our work investigates the search accuracy of 1:First and compares it to
the traditional 1:N search. Several different scenarios are considered trying to emulate real
environments as best as possible: a range of enrollment sizes, closed- and open-set configu-
rations, two iris matchers, and different permutations of the galleries. Results confirm the
expected accuracy degradation using 1:First search, and also allow us to identify acceptable
working parameters where significant search time reduction is achieved, while maintaining
accuracy similar to 1:N search.
Keywords: biometrics, iris recognition, error rates, identification, accuracy, search,
1:First, 1:N, open-set
1. Introduction
One of the most powerful biometric modes is Iris Recognition. It is based on images
from the area of the eye surrounding the pupil, called the iris. Each iris contains a complex
pattern composed of elements like crypts, freckles, filaments, furrows, pits, striations and
rings. These texture details are what make the iris particularly useful for recognition [1].
Since its first demonstration by Daugman [2], iris recognition has evolved to become one
of the best-known biometric characteristics. The largest biometric database in the world, the
Aadhaar program in India, has already collected 1.13 billion people’s irises (and fingerprints)
for enrollment [3].
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In 2016, Somaliland started to register voters using iris biometrics [4]. The motivation
is to prevent voting fraud, after authorities found a large number of duplicate registrations,
even with the use of facial and fingerprint recognition [5]. The decision was made after
months of testing and preparation, aided by a feasibility study by a team of academic
researchers [6].
Since 2002, countries like the United Kingdom, Canada and Singapore have used iris
biometric systems to perform border-crossing checks on frequent travelers. Similarly, the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) has employed an iris-based biometric system to keep track of
banned travelers since 2001. The UAE system is known for performing approximately 14
billion IrisCode comparisons daily [7].
Iris recognition is being deployed in an increasing number of applications, and with larger
and larger database sizes. Although iris matching can be performed in an extremely rapid
manner, the need for optimization becomes stronger as the number of enrolled persons in
applications becomes larger. In this sense, we analyze one search technique that is known
to have been utilized in some operational scenarios, but whose performance and accuracy
have not been considered in the research literature.
In iris databases, the traditional search approach for identification is called 1:N, which
means the entire biometric enrollment is scanned and the best match is selected. For nearly
a decade, the NEXUS border-crossing program [8] employed a variation of this search tech-
nique, called 1:First, in order to improve search speed. In 1:First search, the search of
the biometric enrollment is terminated when the first biometric template that satisfies the
matching threshold is found. This approach generally speeds up the search. However, the
biometric template selected by this approach may not be the best match. The biometric
template matched in 1:First search is more likely to not correspond to the same subject as
does the biometric probe than in 1:N search.
Kuehlkamp and Bowyer [9] found a significant difference in the 1:First False Match Rate
(FMR) in comparison to 1:N search, especially with larger enrollment sizes, and higher
rotation tolerances. However, as pointed out by the authors, [9] was not complete in some
aspects. The enrollment sizes used in the experiments were rather small. The evaluation
was not done using a “commercial quality” iris matcher. And the experiments did not
contemplate open-set scenarios. The objective of this work is to address each of these issues.
In this work, experiments are performed on two iris matchers, the second being a well-
known commercial matcher. Also, we use data augmentation techniques to increase the size
of our dataset, and perform experiments in enrollment sizes that can be more representative
of real world applications. This also allows us to create and test open-set scenarios. In
addition, we perform experiments using different permutations of the same enrollment, in
order to verify how that could affect 1:First accuracy.
2. Background and Related Works
Iris recognition, like other biometric modalities, can be used in two types of identity
management functionality [1]: verification and identification.
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In verification, the task of the system is to verify if the identity claimed by the user is
true. In this case, the biometric reference from the user is compared to a single biometric
probe in the database (one-to-one matching [10]). In turn, when performing identification,
the user does not claim an identity. Consequently, the system has to compare the user’s
biometric probe with the biometric references of potentially all the persons enrolled in the
database (one-to-many matching [10]).
Within identification, it is possible to distinguish closed-set and open-set identification
tasks. With a closed-set, the user is known to be enrolled in the database, and the system
is responsible to determine his or her identity. On the other hand, when doing open-set
identification, the system must, before trying to identify a user, determine if he or she is
enrolled in the database [10]. This work is concerned with one-to-many matching as used in
an identification system, and particularly, with exploring the difference between two possible
implementations of one-to-many.
The comparison procedure is a core part of every biometric identification or verification
system. In this procedure, the system compares the biometric probes acquired from the
user against previously stored biometric references and scores the level of similarity or dis-
similarity between them. According to a predetermined threshold, the system then makes
a decision about the user: either it is a match or a non-match. Declaring a match means
to assume that the system accepts both biometric samples as being originated by the same
human source [10].
2.1. Iris Comparison Output
Two types of errors can be made by biometric systems: False Match (FM) and False Non-
Match (FNM). A FM occurs when biometric probe and biometric reference from different
individuals are incorrectly classified as a match. Conversely, FNM occurs when biometric
probe and biometric reference of the same individual are not recognized as a match [1].
These errors are very similar to Type I (false-positive) and Type II (false-negative) sta-
tistical errors. However, this traditional standpoint usually does not contemplate a scenario
variation: open-set vs. closed-set [11]. In both of these cases, there is an enrollment G
of biometric references, and the comparisons made against that enrollment come from the
biometric probe set P . If the identities in P are a proper subset of G (P ⊆ G), then the
scenario is said to be closed-set. On the other hand, if any of the identities in P are not
contained in G, that is, P = {P ∩G ∧ P 6⊆ G}, the scenario is called open-set.
The different search methods, 1:N and 1:First, can produce different results for the same
biometric probe and list of biometric references [9]. These situations are described in detail
in [9]. Ultimately, this distinction is the source of the accuracy difference between 1:N and
1:First.
2.2. Comparison Output in Closed and Open Set Scenarios
As mentioned by ISO 19795-1:2006 [11], and shown in Table 1, the conventional definition
of comparison results is a little different when considering open-set and closed-set scenarios.
In a closed-set scenario, we have the typical cases of TM and FNM for biometric references.
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An interesting peculiarity of the closed-set scenario is that TNMs cannot happen, because
all the references are enrolled (Tab. 1b).
On the other hand, in an open-set scenario, all four typical cases occur, but there is a
distinction to be made: false matches (Tab. 1c) can occur either as Enrolled False Matches
(EFMs), like in a closed-set, or as Unenrolled False Matches (UFM), when a biometric
probe of an unenrolled individual is similar enough to match one of the enrolled biometric
references.
Table 1: Possible outputs for matching against an enrollment in Closed-set and Open-set scenarios.
Matching Result
Closed-set Open-set
TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE
Enrolled Reference TM FNM TM FNM
Non-Enrolled Reference EFM a N/A b EFM/UFM c TNM
a Enrolled False Match: An enrolled non-mated biometric reference is similar enough to be considered a
match.
b True Non-Match cannot happen, because there are no unenrolled references.
c Unenrolled False Match: An unenrolled biometric reference is similar enough to be considered a match.
2.3. Traditional searching: 1:N
Mukherjee and Ross [12] define the problem of iris identification in terms of comparing
a probe iris sample q, with enrolled iris samples D = {d1, d2, d3, ...dn}, in order to determine
the identity y of the query sample. Each enrollment sample dj, j = 1, 2, ..., n is associated
with an identity yj. Consequently, the computational complexity of the process is directly
linked to the number of enrolled biometric references |D| = n in the enrollment.
Matching iris samples based on Daugman’s approach is an operation that involves the
accumulation of bitwise XOR operations between the biometric templates, and can be done
quite efficiently. However, the computational complexity of the task grows linearly with the
increase in enrollment size, and the complexity for tasks like de-duplication grows quadrat-
ically regarding the size of the database, as noted by [13].
Unlike other numeric or lexicographic data, biometric samples do not have any natural
ordering [14]. This hinders any attempt to index biometric databases. Since there is no
order for the enrollment records, the obvious approach used in automatic iris identification
is to compare the probe to every enrollment record.
Other efforts have been made in the sense of improving the search performance in iris
databases. In [15], the parallelization of the algorithms involved in the iris recognition
process is proposed, including the template matching. However, their parallelized version
still has its overall performance directly associated to the size of the database. In another
attempt to address the issue, Hao et al. [16] propose an approach based on Nearest Neighbor
search, to reduce the search range and thus improve the performance.
If the number of biometric references to be searched is large, it may be slow to sweep
it entirely every time a user is presented to the system. The traditional approach for the
implementation of one-to-many identification is the exhaustive 1:N, and is probably the only
form of one-to-many search to receive attention in the research literature.
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2.4. The alternatives and 1:First search
The need for optimization of computational requirements is motivated by the large scale
of many iris recognition deployments, together with a tendency for deployments to grow
larger over time. Naturally, one can expect the computational demands to increase. Nev-
ertheless, only a small number of proposed indexing methods are found in the literature
[13].
A relatively common approach to speed up the search process is to perform a search
known as 1:First, in which the system sweeps the biometric enrollment until it finds the first
template for which the comparison score meets a defined threshold, and declares a match
[17]. This approach yields a lower number of comparisons on average, compared with the
1:N method. On the other hand, it may lead to a higher error rate, since when a match pair
is found the search is stopped, ignoring other potentially better matches.
If the biometric references are randomly distributed in the database, it is likely that
acceptable matches will be found before the end of the list, thus reducing the search time.
However, this approach raises some questions which have been only partially answered so
far:
1. Does 1:First result in the same identification accuracy as 1:N?
2. If not, how frequently does an acceptable match correspond to a correct match (the
biometric probe and the biometric reference correspond to the same biometric subject)?
3. How good does a match have to be to be considered acceptable?
4. Empirically, does 1:First perform faster than 1:N? If so, how much faster?
Bowyer et al. [18] surveyed several different attempts to improve the matching speed of
iris codes and reduce the time required for database scans. These works report different
degrees of success, but there seems to be no clear trend in performance for iris matching and
searching. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, Kuehlkamp and Bowyer [9] presented
the only work to have experimentally evaluated the 1:First search technique.
3. Methods
Previous results from [9] suggested that the FMR grows as the enrollment size is in-
creased. However, limitations of this work prevent a better understanding of the global
scenario of 1:First performance: enrollment sizes in the range of 100–1400 subjects are
hardly representative of real world applications; only closed-set scenarios were tested; a sin-
gle academic iris matcher was employed; and finally, only a single ordering of the biometric
references was used in the experiments.
A larger and more complex set of experiments was conceived to address these issues:
1) number of biometric references belonging to different subjects in an enrollment ranging
from 500 to 11,000; 2) closed- and open-set scenarios; 3) use of a commercial matcher in
addition to IrisBee for comparison; 4) comparing a biometric probe set against multiple
random permutations of the same enrollment of biometric references.
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3.1. Rotation Tolerance
Rotational mis-alignment can cause two images of the same iris to be misinterpreted as
a non-match. For this reason, iris matchers implement tolerance to iris rotation, in the form
of “best-of-M” comparisons: A pair of iris codes is compared several times, over a range of
relative rotations, and the best match is chosen to be the comparison score for that pair
[19]. As an example, the CBSA NEXUS border-crossing program considers a range of 14
rotation values in the initial scan of the biometric enrollment, and the range is widened to
an additional 28 rotation values if no match was found on the initial scan [20]. This results
in a faster initial scan that picks up the large majority of rotational mis-alignments, and a
further scan, only when needed, to pick up more extreme mis-alignments.
3.2. Closed-set versus Open-set
In closed-set identification the system tries to determine the identity of an unidentified
individual whom is known to be enrolled in the database. Conversely, in open-set identifica-
tion, it is not known if the individual presenting a probe sample is enrolled in the database.
In this case, the system has to determine if the user is in the database, and if so, to find the
corresponding enrolled identity.
The fundamental performance metrics for matching are False Match Rate (FMR) and
False Non-Match Rate (FNMR), as defined by ISO 19795-1:2006 [11]. Since our evaluation
is made at the algorithm level, we do not take into account acquisition or enrollment failures.
FMR is the proportion of probes that are incorrectly declared to match the enrollment of
some different person, while FNMR is defined as the proportion of probes that are incorrectly
declared to not match the enrollment of the same person. In their more specific sense, FMR
and FNMR refer to outcomes of 1:1 matching, although the terms are often also informally
used in the 1:N context.
The standard [11] also defines metrics specific for the identification (1:N matching) task,
namely: True-Positive Identification Rate (TPIR or simply IR), False Negative Identification
Rate (FNIR) and False Positive Identification Rate (FPIR). In general, TPIR, FNIR and
FPIR are terms in the 1:N matching scenario that correspond to the terms TMR, FNMR,
and FPR in the 1:1 matching scenario.
FPIR is a metric that applies specifically to open-set contexts, since it refers to non-
enrolled user presentations, which do not occur in closed-sets. However, there is no definition
in the standard for operations in which biometric probes are incorrectly matched to some
wrong biometric reference (of a different subject). We use the term Enrolled False Positive
Identification Rate (E-FPIR) as an adaptation to extend the open-set metric to cases which,
in verification scenario would be comprehended under FMR.
In our experiments, an identification transaction is the presentation of one probe to the
system, which results in one of two possible outcomes: a) an identity label assigned to that
probe, or b) no identity assigned to the probe, implying that the probe does not match
any of the biometric references. The correctness of the result falls into one of five possible
categories:
1. True Identification (TI) – occurs when the system returns a biometric reference iden-
tifier that corresponds to the biometric subject whose probe was presented;
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2. Enrolled False Positive Identification (E-FPI) – the system returns a biometric refer-
ence identifier that does not correspond to the biometric subject who presented the
probe, and corresponds to another biometric subject whose reference is stored in the
database;
3. True Non-Identification (TNI) – the system returns no biometric reference identifier
and the corresponding biometric reference was not enrolled (this situation can only
happen in an open-set scenario);
4. False Non-Identification (FNI) – the system returns no biometric reference identifier,
but the corresponding biometric reference was in the database;
5. False Positive Identification (FPI) – the system returned a biometric reference iden-
tifier, but the presented probe does not correspond to any biometric references (this
situation only occurs in an open-set scenario).
Using these result categories, we calculate the accuracy metrics in terms of E-FPIR,
FPIR and FNIR for all experiments, in order to evaluate accuracy in each category. In
closed-set experiments, FPIR is omitted because it is, by definition, zero.
3.3. Dataset
Images were selected from a dataset captured using an LG-4000 sensor, during acquisition
sessions performed over the years of 2008 through 2013 at the University of Notre Dame.
In addition to the 57,232 images used in the experiments presented in [9], the University’s
repository contains 51,234 images captured with the same sensor, after a firmware update.
Thus, a total of 108,466 images of left and right eyes were selected, representing a total of
1,991 people, and 3,982 individual eyes.
Before combining the images from before and after the firmware update into one pool for
our experiments, it was necessary to analyze the two sets of images to ensure the update did
not introduce changes that could interfere with the results. Four different aspects of the two
sets of images were compared: a) intensity distributions; b) comparison score distributions;
c) image count distribution by subject; and d) image focus. While intensity and focus did
not reveal significant changes after the upgrade, the analysis of comparison score and subject
distributions revealed some variation. An examination of the data revealed the distortions
were caused not because of the firmware update, but because of a few subjects who had a
much higher image count than the average due to participating in experiments for specific
research purposes. These subjects were removed from this dataset.
3.3.1. Simulating more individuals for increased enrollment size
In order to perform experiments on the largest possible galleries and probe sets, we use
a data augmentation technique to increase the number of unique eyes in our dataset. It is
known that there is no correlation between the left and right iris of the same person, and
in the same sense, orientation of two different images of the same iris must be correctly
aligned in order to generate an identity match [21]. Based on this, we performed two spatial
transformations on the original images of the set: 180◦ rotation and horizontal flipping.
To make sure the spatial transformation does not result in a set that diverges from
the properties of the original, we selected the oldest image of each eye of each subject, on
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which we applied rotation and flipping, creating four other sets of 1,991 images each. Next,
we performed all-versus-all matching using IrisBee and compared the Hamming Distance
distributions. Each set of images resulted in approximately 2 million one-way comparisons.
As shown in Figure 1, there is very little difference between the six sets.
As an additional verification, we compared the FMR obtained from matching original
images and from matching artificial images. Abnormalities in the images or the matching
process would likely cause an increase in FM, however that did not happen. Figure 2
illustrates this: FMR is slightly lower for artificial images than it is for original images. This
is justified by the fact that there are approximately three times more artificial images than
original ones.
The final data set is composed by the union of these six sets, amounting to 11,946 unique
eyes, which for the purposes of this work, were then considered as unique subjects. Finally,
the rotation and flipping transformations were applied to all available images, resulting in
a total of 325,398 images that were used in the experiments.
3.4. Enrollment and Probe Set Formation
From this augmented data set, we created 22 subject-disjoint galleries varying in size
from 500 to 11,000 subjects, in increments of 500. To select these galleries, we picked the
single oldest image for each person, for each eye, and for each transformation (original,
rotated and flipped). We call this set the Enrollment Pool. Images were randomly drawn
from the Enrollment Pool to form each of the experimental galleries.
After forming the galleries, the remaining 313,452 images were used as a Probe Pool to
create closed probe sets for each of the galleries. Then, for each subject in the enrollment,
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Figure 1: Comparison of HD distributions between original and artificial images.
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Figure 2: Comparison of FMR for matching performed on original and artificial images. In all cases, FMR
is below 0.0003.
the corresponding images in the Probe Pool were added to the probe set. The total size
of each probe set varies according to the number of images available for each subject. The
smallest probe set has 10,836 probes, and the largest was limited to 20,000.
To create open probe sets, a similar procedure was adopted: for each enrollment subject,
a closed probe set with size N × 1.5 was randomly drawn from the Probe Pool, where N is
the size of the enrollment. Next, a set of N×1.5
2
images from subjects not in the enrollment
was added to the selection to form the open portion of the probe set.
Finally, for each image the corresponding biometric references and biometric feature sets
(constituting biometric probes) were calculated using two different iris recognition methods:
IrisBee and Neurotechnology VeriEye.
As an example, an enrollment of 500 subjects yields a closed probe set of biometric probes
corresponding to 500× 1.5 = 750 enrolled subjects, and biometric probes corresponding to
750/2 = 375 non-enrolled subjects are added as the open (or non-enrolled) portion of the
probe set. The final probe set size in this case is 750 + 375 = 1, 125 probes, where ∼ 33% of
them correspond to non-enrolled subjects. Table 2 describes the composition of the galleries
and their respective probe sets.
3.5. Threshold Selection
The “strictness” of an iris recognition application is regulated by a threshold that stipu-
lates the minimum similarity required between two samples so that they can be considered
a match. This threshold is usually set experimentally, and it is defined as a value in the
scale of the matcher output.
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Table 2: Enrollment and Probe Set Composition
Enrollment Closed Probe Set Open Probe Set
Size Original Rotated Flipped Size Original Rotated Flipped Size Original Rotated Flipped
500 167 163 170 10836 3303 4222 3311 1125 388 366 371
1000 327 342 331 20000 6679 6004 7317 2250 730 752 768
1500 474 507 519 20000 6502 6180 7318 3375 1111 1103 1161
2000 661 667 672 20000 6751 6678 6571 4500 1524 1489 1487
2500 806 848 846 20000 5950 6928 7122 5625 1832 1912 1881
3000 1024 995 981 20000 6570 6822 6608 6750 2306 2219 2225
3500 1184 1163 1153 20000 6850 6090 7060 7875 2658 2644 2573
4000 1298 1340 1362 20000 6714 6363 6923 9000 3015 2999 2986
4500 1493 1513 1494 20000 6530 6994 6476 10125 3415 3397 3313
5000 1675 1654 1671 20000 6554 6846 6600 11250 3878 3705 3667
5500 1836 1858 1806 20000 6984 6672 6344 12375 4129 4131 4115
6000 2012 1986 2002 20000 6238 6899 6863 13500 4532 4423 4545
6500 2162 2199 2139 20000 6823 6422 6755 14625 4853 5005 4767
7000 2355 2318 2327 20000 6802 6466 6732 15750 5183 5264 5303
7500 2482 2488 2530 20000 6715 6667 6618 16875 5557 5644 5674
8000 2730 2607 2663 20000 6808 6389 6803 18000 6014 6058 5928
8500 2817 2845 2838 20000 6740 6805 6455 19125 6371 6301 6453
9000 2988 3023 2989 20000 6651 6689 6660 20250 6776 6829 6645
9500 3147 3182 3171 20000 6641 6768 6591 21375 7108 7058 7209
10000 3365 3328 3307 20000 6726 6797 6477 22500 7514 7328 7658
10500 3502 3535 3463 20000 6657 6739 6604 23625 7685 7722 8218
11000 3674 3676 3650 20000 6723 6638 6639 24750 8140 8277 8333
Daugman-style iris matchers like IrisBee use Hamming Distance as the scale of dis-
similarity between samples. This scale goes from 0.0 (no dissimilarity) to 1.0 (complete
dissimilarity). VeriEye, on the other hand, uses a similarity scale to compare samples. It
ranges from 0 (minimal similarity) to a maximum observed similarity score of 9,443. Since
there is no direct relation between the two scales, it is necessary to establish an equivalence
between values, so that we can make a fair comparison of the two matcher results.
To do so, we ran matching using the largest available enrollment (11,000 references) and
its corresponding probe set (20,000 probes), resulting in more than 200 million compar-
isons. Using the comparison score output for each comparison, we plotted the Cumulative
Distribution Function (CDF) for the genuine and impostor distributions. Figure 3 shows
examples of the threshold selection for IrisBee and VeriEye. Based on the impostor CDFs,
five threshold values were selected, corresponding to 0.0001%, 0.001%, 0.01%, 0.1% and 1%
of the impostor comparisons. This ensures we have thresholds corresponding to five distinct
Accuracy Targets. An example of this equivalence is shown in Table 3.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Closed-set Scenario
Figures 4 and 5 show a performance comparison between 1:N and 1:First, in terms of their
performance scores, in closed-set scenarios under different accuracy settings. Identification
was performed using both matchers, over a range of accuracy targets going from more strict
(top) to less strict (bottom). In the case of the less strict accuracy targets, we can perceive
a pronounced trend in 1:First (right column) performance: E-FPIR grows continuously as
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Figure 3: CDF-based threshold selection. Observe that the Cumulative Distribution curves are very dif-
ferent in format for IrisBee (top row) and VeriEye (bottom row): This happens because the matchers use
dissimilarity and similarity scales, respectively.
Table 3: Empirically selected threshold for closed-set with 14 rotations
Accuracy Target (Max. False Matches) IrisBee Threshold VeriEye Threshold
1% 0.3780 21
0.1% 0.3263 31
0.01% 0.1475 42
0.001% 0a 84
0.0001% 0a 306
a The matcher could not achieve the accuracy target.
the enrollment size increases, but the same does not occur in 1:N (left column). In the worst
cases (larger galleries with less strict accuracy target), 1:First E-FPIR reaches nearly 100%,
while the same metric obtained by 1:N remains below 10%.
Comparison between Figures 4 and 5 confirms the expected higher accuracy of commer-
cial matcher VeriEye as opposed to the research software IrisBee. The most strict accuracy
target achieved by IrisBee is 0.001% with an FNIR around 80%, while VeriEye reached a
target accuracy of 0.0001% with FNIR not going above 20%. Both matchers, however, show
the same types of trends when we compare 1:N and 1:First searches. 1:First search shows a
strong tendency to higher E-FPIRs when the target accuracy is less strict than 0.01%. On
the other hand, if the target accuracy is more strict than a certain limit, 1:N and 1:First
are very similar. As it could be expected given the differences in overall accuracy between
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Figure 4: Identification performance of IrisBee in closed-set scenario, at different accuracy targets.
the matchers, this threshold is different for each of them: with IrisBee, 1:N and 1:First have
similar performances for target accuracies more strict than 0.01%. With VeriEye, the same
occurs when target accuracy is more strict than 0.001%. This is verified by the similarly
sized TPIR and FNIR bars in the upper plots in these figures.
FNIR however does not suffer the same kind of influence by the search method: both
IrisBee and VeriEye display the same values for FNIR, regardless if they were achieved
through 1:N or 1:First search. This is explained by the definition of FNIR. In order for
a Non-Match to be declared, it is necessary that the system have gone through the entire
enrollment. In this case, there is no difference between 1:N and 1:First search.
4.2. Rotation Tolerance
Tolerance to iris rotation can interfere with the accuracy of the matcher, since the higher
the number of rotations allowed, the higher the chance that the IrisCode will randomly
match another unrelated iris. This interference can be compensated by the selection of a
more restrictive threshold, as the rotational tolerance is increased. In the threshold selection
procedure described in Section 3.5, we have considered three rotational tolerance levels and
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Figure 5: Identification performance of VeriEye in closed-set, at different accuracy targets.
chosen the thresholds individually to compensate for it. To illustrate this, Figure 6 demon-
strates a very small variance in E-FPIR and FNIR across different rotational tolerances, in
both matchers and search methods.
4.3. Open-set Scenario
Open-set scenario results can be seen in Figures 7a and 7b. In these cases, 33.33% of the
probes correspond to subjects that are not enrolled in the enrollment. In these scenarios, we
only present results in terms of E-FPIR, since there was no measurable difference between
1:N and 1:First in FPIR, FNIR and TPIR. Also, we do not use the same type of bar plot,
because E-FPIR and FPIR are not complementary i.e., their summation exceeds 100%. The
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Figure 6: Identification performance across different rotation tolerances.
same types of trends found in the closed-set scenarios are present here: if the accuracy target
of the system is not highly restrictive, 1:First search yields worse results than 1:N, and the
difference grows proportionally to the size of the galleries. At first, comparing the worst E-
FPIR open-set cases with the corresponding closed-set experiment, E-FPIR seems to have
decreased (in some cases, from ∼ 100% to ∼ 60%). This fact is explained by the presence
of unenrolled subjects in the probe set, which corresponds to one third of the probes.
An interesting note about this is that despite the fact that VeriEye is in general more
accurate than IrisBee, E-FPIR behavior manifested similarly in both matchers. At accuracy
target 0.01%, E-FPIR is generally higher for VeriEye than for IrisBee, when using 1:First
search (red series in Figs. 7a and 7b).
Although not shown in the figures, another interesting fact revealed in the open-set
scenario is that the negative impact of 1:First search in E-FPIR is not verified in FPIR.
Again, it can be explained if we look closely at what happens in 1:First search: if a search
for an enrolled probe is interrupted because a better-than-threshold match was found, there
is a non-zero probability that a better (and true) match could be found if the search was
continued – that is, if we were performing 1:N instead, we could get a better result by finding
the genuine match (and consequently declaring a true match). But if the search for a probe
that is not enrolled is interrupted in 1:First, the best that we could do if we continue the
search is to find a better false match, so the result would still be a false match.
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Figure 7: E-FPIR identification performance in open-set scenario, at different accuracy targets.
Like in closed-set experiments, there is practically no difference between 1:N and 1:First
scores at highly strict accuracy targets (0.0001%, on the left of the figure). As the system
strictness is relaxed, 1:First E-FPIR starts to grow much higher than 1:N E-FPIR, increasing
with the size of the enrollment. This starts to happen at the accuracy target 0.01%. At
the same time, FNIR is close to zero in these cases. Still, the divergence between search
methods in terms of FPIR or FNIR is negligible in all cases, revealing how 1:First affects
specifically the E-FPIR score.
A similar overview is shown in Figure 7b, which contains VeriEye performance scores
in open-set scenarios. All the scores present the same trends found in IrisBee results. As
expected from a high accuracy matcher, FNIR for VeriEye is below 10% in all cases. On
the other hand, its performance in the unenrolled portion of the probe set (FPIR) is worse
than IrisBee by as much as 24%. 1:First search also had worse overall results than IrisBee
regarding the E-FPIR, but not as accentuated as FPIR.
4.4. Enrollment Permutations
Contrary to what happens in 1:N search, 1:First accuracy can be affected by the ordering
of the enrollment. To better understand how this effect could interfere in search accuracy,
we perform experiments in which the probe set is presented to different permutations of the
same enrollment. These experiments are also performed on both matchers, using the same
matching thresholds presented so far.
Figure 8a presents performance scores for IrisBee in an open-set scenario across 20 ran-
dom enrollment permutations. In this figure, the distribution of scores is plotted for each
enrollment size. As expected, 1:N results show no variance in performance. Using 1:First
search however, some degree of variance in E-FPIR exists, if the system accuracy target is
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Figure 8: E-FPIR identification performance in open-set scenario, at different accuracy targets, with 20
random enrollment permutations.
permissive enough (E-FPIR at accuracy target 0.01% or less strict). At the highest toler-
ance setting (E-FPIR at accuracy target 1%), 1:First performance is so degraded that even
variance is very small.
The general tendencies for both search methods however, remain the same: performance
degradation starts to appear at a moderate level of strictness (0.01%), and gets worse when
the system is more lenient (0.1% and 1%). 1:First presents a moderate amount of variation
in E-FPIR, and variance seems to decrease as the enrollment size increases.
In general, the same trends found in IrisBee results are seen in VeriEye. Comparing these
results with IrisBee, the most distinguishing case is at target accuracy 0.01%, where 1:First
scores for VeriEye are in general higher than for IrisBee, while FNIR is under 5% for both
matchers. In more tolerant levels (target accuracy 0.1% and 1%), the difference in 1:First
error rates is not so accentuated, but is still a little higher in VeriEye than in IrisBee.
Additionally, we observe the dynamics of E-FPIR as the matching threshold is relaxed.
Figure 9 illustrates the result of this experiment. Note that the threshold scale (x axis) of
VeriEye is inverted in relation to IrisBee, because it uses a similarity score (as explained in
Section 3.5). This graph shows how differently E-FPIR behaves under the different search
methods. Using 1:N search E-FPIR grows linearly as the threshold is made more lenient,
and it never grows above 2%. On the other hand, when performing 1:First search, E-FPIR
grows exponentially as we adjust the threshold to a more permissive setting.
On the other hand, the graph suggests it is possible to find an optimal threshold setting,
where 1:First performance loss is minimal. For instance, if the target accuracy of 0.001% is
selected, we can expect no serious degradation of E-FPIR, while still maintaining acceptable
FNIR.
16
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Threshold (Dissimilarity)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
E-
FP
IR
Comparative IrisBee Error Rates
Acc Tgt. 
1.0000%
Acc Tgt. 
0.1000%
Acc Tgt. 
0.0100%
Acc Tgt. 
0.0010%Acc Tgt. 
0.0001%
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Threshold (Similarity)
Comparative VeriEye Error Rates
Acc Tgt. 
0.0010%
Acc Tgt. 
1.0000%
Acc Tgt. 
0.1000%
Acc Tgt. 
0.0100%
Acc Tgt. 
0.0001%
1:N
1:First
Fitted curve
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linearly, 1:First search results in an exponential growth when the threshold is made more lenient.
4.5. Speed vs. Accuracy
The whole rationale behind 1:First search is that it is more efficient than 1:N. However,
the usual notion is that 1:First is faster “on average”, but no quantification is given. Our
experiments use the number of iris template comparisons as a speed measurement. In
order to be able to compare these measurements, we normalize the number of comparisons
performed in the search by the total possible comparisons. This way, 1:N will always present
a normalized number of comparisons of 1 – because the whole enrollment is scanned. On the
other hand, 1:First will yield a score smaller than 1, since the search is interrupted before
reaching the end of the enrollment.
Figure 10 presents graphs that relate the search accuracy (in terms of TPIR), to search
performance (in normalized number of comparisons). All the 1:N results (circles) overlap
almost perfectly in the top right corner of the plots. For this reason it is not possible to see
1:N results for all accuracy targets. At the same time, 1:First (Xs), scatter in a diagonal
that ends near the origin. As the accuracy target is relaxed, a proportional reduction in
accuracy and number of comparisons is observed. Such degradation does not occur in the
two strictest settings (blue and orange).
The red dotted line represents the worst accuracy obtained by 1:N search. All 1:First
results for accuracy targets above 0.001% are above this line, meaning they produce accu-
racies comparable to 1:N, but performing only ∼ 50 − 70% of comparisons. Also, at these
accuracy targets, the linear degradation trend does not seem to take place.
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5. Conclusions
The general tendency that can be apprehended in these experiments is that other pa-
rameters kept the same, 1:First search usually has worse accuracy than 1:N search. 1:First
search accuracy degrades more quickly with increased enrollment size than does 1:N accu-
racy: this trend happened in all experiments and scenarios, specifically under the E-FPIR
metric.
Making the system tolerance for identification more strict can lower the FPIR, but at
the cost of increasing the FNIR. If the system is set to a very restrictive accuracy target of
0.0001%, there is no perceptible difference between the search methods in terms of FPIR,
but FNIR can start becoming too high for practical use.
Our experiments with larger enrollment sizes revealed no contradicting trends from the
experiments with smaller galleries [9]. In fact, it illustrates how 1:First search accuracy
degradation is closely connected to the enrollment size, while the same does not happen
with 1:N. Previous work shows how FPIR grows in small galleries [9], and although at a
lower rate than 1:First, 1:N accuracy also degrades. Experiments with larger galleries showed
that the accuracy degradation in 1:N is a phenomenon specific of small galleries: once false
positive identification stabilizes at galleries of ∼ 1500 subjects, it does not increase again,
regardless of the enrollment size (Figs. 4, 5, 7a and 7b). An image quality assessment would
certainly improve the understanding of 1:First performance in relation to 1:N, and could be
an important topic for future research.
Perhaps one of the most intriguing results regards the behavior of matchers in open-set
scenarios: although the error rate for the enrolled portion of the probe set remains similar to
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what was previously found, the unenrolled error rate revealed a different trend. Unlike with
the E-FPIR, FPIR calculation showed there is no difference in accuracy between 1:N and
1:First in the unenrolled portion of the probe set. However not obvious, this fact is explained
by the way 1:First works. If a 1:First search for a probe is interrupted, one of two situations
occur: a) a positive identification is declared, if the biometric reference corresponds to the
same subject as the biometric probe; or b) a false positive identification is declared, if the
biometric reference and biometric probe do not correspond to the same subject. Yet, when
the subject corresponding to a biometric probe is unenrolled (has no corresponding biometric
reference in a database), it does not matter if the search is interrupted, because the only
possible outcomes are either a true negative or a false positive identification.
The last set of experiments confirmed all the previous tendencies for the behavior of 1:N
and 1:First searches. Performing 1:First search against different permutations of the same
enrollment introduces some degree of variance into the results, but the standard error from
the mean does not exceed 6%.
Experiments show that E-FPIR performance degradation in 1:First search has an ex-
ponential relation with the threshold relaxation. It is possible, though, to find an optimal
comparison threshold at a reasonable accuracy setting and this way be able to use 1:First
search with little performance degradation in comparison to 1:N. In our experiments, this
occurred for accuracy targets of 0.001% or 0.0001%. Nevertheless, it is important to keep
in mind that at these accuracy targets, FNIR starts to increase and may impair system
usability.
Finally, our experiments show that 1:First search is able to achieve accuracy comparable
to 1:N while performing only ∼ 50 − 70% of the comparisons. However, if accuracy target
is relaxed, performance degrades proportionally to the reduction in search comparisons.
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